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The Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) is proposing to support and clarify the short selling framework under UMIR by:
To provide further clarity and a more complete view of the resulting regulatory framework, we are simultaneously publishing proposed guidance for comment (GN-URPart3-24-0001) that clarifies various current and proposed requirements related to short sales and failed trades (Proposed Guidance).
Along with CSA staff, we will continue to explore other areas of short sale regulations where additional regulatory measures may be appropriate, including but not limited to mandatory close-out requirements. Any additional proposed requirements would be introduced separately and published for comment as part of the policy development process.
How to Submit Comments
Comments on the Proposed Amendments should be in writing and delivered by April 12, 2024 to:
Theodora Lam
Acting Director, Market Regulation Policy
Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization
Suite 2000
121 King Street West Toronto, Ontario M5H 3T9
e-mail: tlam@ciro.ca
Comments should also be delivered to the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA):
Market Regulation Ontario Securities Commission | Capital Markets Regulation B.C. Securities Commission |
Commentators should be aware that a copy of their comment letter will be made publicly available on the CIRO website at www.ciro.ca.
We published Joint CSA/IIROC Staff Notice 23-329 Short Selling in Canada to request public feedback on Canada’s short selling regulatory framework, and received 23 comment letters. On November 16, 2023, the CSA and CIRO published Joint CSA/CIRO Staff Notice 23-332 Summary of Comments and Responses to CSA/IIROC Staff Notice 23-329 Short Selling in Canada that provided a summary of the comments received and the regulators’ response to those comments.
In Joint CSA/CIRO Staff Notice 23-332 we indicated that CIRO is working on ways to support the current short selling framework, in part by reinforcing the obligation to have a reasonable expectation to settle a short sale on settlement date.
Along with CSA staff, we will continue to explore other areas of short sale regulations where additional regulatory measures may be appropriate, including but not limited to mandatory close-out requirements. Any additional proposed requirements would be introduced separately and published for comment as part of the policy development process.
We are publishing the Proposed Amendments and Proposed Guidance for a 90-day public comment period.
The Proposed Amendments and Proposed Guidance take the public interest into account by:
The Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) is proposing to support and clarify the short selling framework under UMIR by:
To provide further clarity and a more complete view of the resulting regulatory framework, we are simultaneously publishing proposed guidance for comment GN-URPart3-24-0001 that clarifies the current and proposed requirements related to short sales and failed trades (Proposed Guidance).
The proposed provision would require a seller to have a reasonable expectation to settle any resulting trade on settlement date before entering an order for a short sale on a marketplace. We break down the various aspects of the proposed requirement below.
Prior to order entry
The proposed provision would be a new requirement for a Participant or Access Person to establish before entering an order that would result in a short sale on a marketplace. Documenting how a reasonable expectation to settle prior to order entry was established would help Participants and Access Persons demonstrate compliance with this new positive obligation.1
Whether a trade ultimately settles would not support the claim that a reasonable expectation to settle the trade existed before the time of order entry. Therefore, the fact that a trade did not ultimately fail would not in itself be sufficient evidence to show that the seller had a reasonable expectation to settle prior to order entry.
By settlement date
The proposed provision would require a seller to have a reasonable expectation to settle on the date contemplated on the execution of the trade. Unless a trade on the marketplace was executed as a Special Terms Order2 using a different settlement date, all trades executed on a marketplace must currently settle by T+2, which is expected to change to T+1 on May 27, 2024.3
Trades that do not settle by the date contemplated on the execution of a trade will be considered a “failed trade”4. In order to settle a short sale under the UMIR 1.1 definition of a “failed trade”, the Participant or Access Person must make:
to permit settlement, regardless of whether the trade has been settled in accordance with the rules or requirements of the clearing agency.5 This means that a trade will still be considered a failed trade if the seller failed to deliver the securities as required, regardless of whether the trade settled through netting and novation by the CDS Clearing and Depository Services Inc. (CDS).
The following table sets out the differences and similarities between the existing prohibition in Policy 2.2 and the proposed requirement in UMIR 3.3 to have a reasonable expectation to settle on settlement date:
| Existing requirement in paragraph (2)(h) of UMIR Policy 2.2 | Proposed requirement in UMIR 3.3(1) |
|---|---|
|
|
We note that the current requirement in Policy 2.2 Manipulative and Deceptive Activities may be difficult for certain dealers to discern when this prohibition is in effect given that the provision is situated in a section that applies to manipulative and deceptive trading.6 The proposed technical requirement in UMIR 3.3 is intended to clearly impose an obligation to have a reasonable expectation to settle on settlement date before entering an order that would result in a short sale and would not entail any consideration of manipulative or deceptive behavior in order to apply. We expect that the positive obligation together with the clear understanding that no analysis of the presence of manipulative and deceptive trading is required would assist dealers in complying with this proposed provision.
The proposed provision focuses only on short sales and would not replace the requirement in Policy 2.2, which continues to apply to all sales (both long and short). We believe that the requirement in Policy 2.2 is important to support the policy objective of prohibiting the false or misleading appearance of trading activity.
In the following sections we set out factors that would affect the ability of Participants and Access Persons to show a reasonable expectation to settle a short sale under the Proposed Amendments.
Client History – Presence of Prior Failed Trades
A prior failed trade may negatively impact whether a Participant can demonstrate a reasonable expectation to settle future short sales for the same client in certain circumstances. This would include any prior failed trades that may not have persisted beyond ten trading days past settlement date to trigger an extended failed trade report to CIRO under UMIR 7.10. Ascertaining the reason for the previously failed trade with the client can help the Participant determine if there is an impact on a reasonable expectation to settle future short sales from that client.
For example, if a Participant learns that the reason for the previous failed trade was due to an administrative error, this may not have a negative impact on a reasonable expectation to settle future short sales from that client.
However, if a Participant relied on a client’s attestation on having access to the necessary securities and that trade resulted in a failed trade under UMIR 1.1 due to the client’s negligence or false claim, it may not be reasonable to readily rely on such attestations from that client in relation to future potential short sales.
Whether a Security has been Determined to be “Hard-to-Borrow”7
Before entering an order for a hard-to-borrow security that upon execution would result in a short sale, Participants or Access Persons may need to make additional arrangements to have a reasonable expectation to settle the resulting trade on settlement date. This may include pre-borrowing a sufficient number of securities to settle the trade where appropriate.
If a Participant or Access Person cannot establish a reasonable expectation to settle the resulting trade on settlement date, the entry of a sell order on a marketplace that on execution would result in a short sale is prohibited.
One way to demonstrate a reasonable expectation to settle under the Proposed Amendments, is to rely on easy-to-borrow lists8 of securities, provided that such lists only include securities that are readily available.
Below we have set out some considerations on how Participants and Access Persons can compile, monitor and use easy-to-borrow lists:
How to Compile
Participants and Access Persons may consider the following factors when determining the securities to include on an easy-to-borrow list:
Importantly, a particular security that has not been determined to be hard-to-borrow, does not automatically mean it can be assumed to be easy-to-borrow.
How to Monitor
In order for a Participant or Access Person to reasonably rely on an easy-to-borrow list to comply with the Proposed Amendments, the availability of securities on such lists must be monitored and updated on a regular basis.
How to Use
We expect that Participants and Access Persons would only rely on easy-to-borrow lists that they have compiled or from dealers with whom they have established a formal relationship regarding clearing or settlement, as such dealers usually provide assurances to their clients that securities included on these lists are readily available.
For example, if a Participant or Access Person obtained an easy-to-borrow list from a dealer, but it does not trade or clear through that dealer and the dealer has not agreed to make securities on that list available to the Participant or Access Person – the Participant or Access Person would not have a reasonable expectation to access those securities and in turn not have a reasonable expectation to settle the trade on settlement date. As a result, it would not be reasonable for the Participant to rely on that list.
Before sending a self-directed order from a client to a marketplace that upon execution would result in a short sale, Participants must ensure compliance with reasonable expectations to settle any resulting trade on settlement date.
As a best practice, Participants that trade inter-listed securities may consider expanding the use of technological solutions that are already in use for compliance with other rules, such as Regulation SHO10 by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States or the EU Short Selling Regulation (SSR)11.
Proper use of the short-marking exempt order12 marker, including by entities with Marketplace Trading Obligations13 trading in their securities of responsibility, would generally enter orders with a reasonable expectation to settle. This is because entities with Marketplace Trading Obligations would not, in the ordinary course, have more than a nominal position at the end of a trading day, whether long or short, in any particular security.
Participants and Access Persons should refer to Notices 16-0028 and 16-0029 for further details on the proper use of the short-marking exempt order marker.
To demonstrate compliance with the proposed positive requirement for a reasonable expectation to settle, Participants and Access Persons would need to update their:
We do not expect that Participants and Access Persons who already have supervisory and gatekeeper procedures and processes in place to ensure sellers have a reasonable expectation to settle under the current requirement in UMIR Policy 2.2, would need to make significant further changes to comply with the proposed changes to UMIR 7.1 and UMIR 10.16.
As part of the Proposed Amendments, we are consolidating certain UMIR requirements that are related to short selling under Part 3 of UMIR. Currently there are requirements that are related to short selling in different parts of the UMIR rulebook. By moving these requirements to one common section that is focused on short selling, we aim to help Participants and Access Persons understand and comply with the current short selling regulatory framework in UMIR.
In the impact assessment table below, we list:
The Proposed Amendments are intended to:
Participants and Access Persons would need to consider changes to update their systems and processes to ensure there is a reasonable expectation to settle prior to the entry of an order on a marketplace that upon execution, would result in a short sale.
Participants would also need to consider changes to develop policies and procedures to:
We do not know the specific costs without detailed stakeholder feedback however we believe these costs would not be significant.
We believe that, if approved, the Proposed Amendments would result in:
Similar to the current requirement in Policy 2.2, the Proposed Amendments would have a greater impact on regions where there are a higher number of:
We are of the view that any negative impacts are outweighed by the positive impacts that would result from the Proposed Amendments.
CIRO does not expect Participants and Access Persons to undertake substantial implementation efforts in order to achieve compliance with the Proposed Amendments, which impose similar requirements as the current rule in paragraph 2(h) of UMIR Policy 2.2.
We propose at least a 90-day implementation period after the publication notice of approval. We are mindful of the fact that the industry is currently preparing to move to a T+1 settlement cycle in 2024 and would not impose an effective date before the implementation to T+1 is completed.
While comment is requested on all aspects of the Proposed Amendments, comment is also specifically requested on the following questions:
The Proposed Amendments would:
The Proposed Amendments do not impose any requirements that CIRO, its Members or Approved Persons must comply with in order to become exempted from a requirement of securities legislation.
The Board of Directors of CIRO (Board) has determined the Proposed Amendments to be in the public interest and on November 15, 2023 approved them for public comment.
We consulted with the following CIRO advisory committees on this matter:
After considering the comments on the Proposed Amendments received in response to this Request for Comments together with any comments of the CSA, CIRO staff may recommend revisions to the Proposed Amendments. If the revisions and comments received are not material in nature, the Board has authorized the President to approve the revisions on CIRO’s behalf and the revised Proposed Amendments will be subject to approval by the CSA. If the revisions or comments are material, CIRO staff will submit the Proposed Amendments, including any revisions, to the Board for approval for republication or implementation, as applicable.
Appendix A – Impact Assessment
Appendix B - Proposed Amendments to UMIR (clean)
Appendix C - Proposed Amendments to UMIR (blacklined and clean)
Appendix A – Impact Assessment
| Description of Proposed Amendment | Related intended benefits | Impact on clients | Impact on issuers | Impact on Participants or Access Persons | Impact on Marketplaces | Impact on CIRO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adding a new requirement under UMIR 3.3 to have a reasonable expectation to settle prior to the entry of an order for a short sale on a marketplace | Proposed Amendments would support the current regulatory framework on short selling, and is intended to minimize any potential settlement disruption in order to reduce the associated risks of short selling. | Neutral – Proposed Amendments would strengthen investor confidence by helping ensure sellers deliver securities in a timely manner in connection with a short sale. Clients that wish to short certain securities that may be deemed hard-to-borrow may need to incur additional fees prior to trading in order to ensure the availability of securities for settlement. | Net positive – Proposed Amendments would address concerns of certain issuers regarding short selling by imposing a positive obligation to have a reasonable expectation to settle on settlement date prior to the entry of a short sale order on a marketplace. | Neutral to net positive – Proposed Amendments would supplement and reinforce the existing requirement on Participants and Access Persons pursuant to paragraph 2(h) of Part 2 of Policy 2.2. Participants and Access Persons should already have the processes and systems in place to prevent trading without a reasonable expectation to settle. | Neutral – Proposed Amendments would strengthen market efficiency by helping ensure sellers deliver securities in a timely manner in connection with a short sale. If there are certain securities where a reasonable expectation to settle cannot be established, the Proposed Amendments may affect the ability to conduct short selling on the marketplace. | Net positive - Facilitates CIRO’s enforcement of a technical requirement to have a reasonable expectation to settle separate from the prohibition on manipulative and deceptive activities in Part 2 of Policy 2.2. |
| Adding a new requirement for potential violations of new UMIR provision 3.3 to be reportable as a gatekeeper report under UMIR 10.16 | Proposed changes to UMIR 10.16 would require Participants and Access Persons to report potential violations of UMIR 3.3 as a gatekeeper report within the applicable timeframe under UMIR 10.16. | Neutral – proposed changes to UMIR 10.16 does not impose any additional impact on clients. | Neutral – proposed changes to UMIR 10.16 does not impose additional impact on issuers. | Minor negative – Requiring potential violations of proposed UMIR 3.3 to be reportable to CIRO as a gatekeeper report should not have a large impact on Participants and Access Persons, as the existing requirement for a reasonable expectation to settle in UMIR Policy 2.2 is already a reportable violation in UMIR 10.16. | Neutral – proposed changes to UMIR 10.16 does not impose any additional impact on marketplaces. | Net positive – Facilitates CIRO’s oversight of proposed requirements in UMIR 3.3 by requiring Participants and Access Persons to report potential violations to CIRO. |
| Including the new UMIR 3.3 to the list of UMIR provisions for which Participants must develop written policies and procedures and conduct regular compliance reviews as part of their supervision system under Part 3 of Policy 7.1. | Proposed changes to UMIR 7.1 would require Participants to develop policies and procedures and update their supervision systems to ensure compliance with the proposed requirement in UMIR 3.3. | Neutral – proposed changes to UMIR 7.1 does not impose any impact on clients. | Neutral – proposed changes to UMIR 7.1 does not impose any impact on issuers. | Minor negative – Proposed changes to UMIR 7.1 should not have a large impact on Participants as they should already have written policies and procedures in place to prevent trading without a reasonable expectation to settle pursuant to Policy 2.2. | Neutral – proposed changes to UMIR 3.3 does not impose any additional impact on marketplaces | Net positive – Facilitates review by CIRO’s Trading Conduct Compliance teams by requiring Participants to demonstrate compliance with UMIR 3.3 through updates to its policies and procedures and regular compliance checks as part of the Participant’s supervision system. |
| Moving provisions related to short selling to a common section within UMIR | Proposed Amendments in the form of renumbering of existing sections would not involve any material changes to existing provisions – only renumbers existing sections to move provisions related to short selling within a common spot in UMIR. | Neutral – Proposed Amendments in the form of renumbering of existing sections does not impose any impact on clients. | Neutral – Proposed Amendments in the form of renumbering of existing sections does not impose any impact on issuers. | Neutral to net positive – While the Proposed Amendments would not impose any impact on Participants or Access Persons, moving provisions related to short selling to Part 3 of UMIR should make it easier for Participants and Access Persons to see and understand current requirements. | Neutral – Proposed Amendments in the form of renumbering of existing sections does not impose any impact on marketplaces. | Neutral – Proposed Amendments in the form of section renumbering would change the order of existing sections but not add any new requirements. |
Appendix B – Proposed Amendments to UMIR (clean)
3.2 Prohibition on the Entry of Orders
...
3.3 Reasonable expectation to settle prior to the entry of an order for a short sale
3.4 Short Selling after a Reportable Extended Failed Trade
6.1 Entry of Orders to a Marketplace
…
(4)-(6) repealed
…
Part 3 of UMIR Policy 7.1 – Supervision and Compliance Procedures for Trading on a Marketplace
…
Each Participant must develop written policies and procedures in relation to all Requirements that apply to their business activities. A Participant’s supervision system must at a minimum include the regular review of compliance with respect to the following provisions for trading on a marketplace where applicable to their lines of business:
…
10.4 Extension of Restrictions
10.16 Gatekeeper Obligations of Directors, Officers and Employees of Participants and Access Persons
Rule 2.3 respecting improper orders and trades;
(c.1) Subsection (1) of Rule 3.3 respecting a reasonable expectation to settle prior to the entry of an order for a short sale;
…
(h) Any Requirement that has been designated by the Market Regulator for the purposes of this subsection.
…
01/11/24
24-0003
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